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Abstract 
 
For the military, effective human-agent teaming 
requires a shared understanding between the human 
and the intelligent agents acting on their behalf.  One 
of the central challenges associated with developing 
this shared understanding originates at the information 
level. The simple fact is while all information may be 
created equal, the value of information is not. 
Confounding this calculation is the knowledge that the 
true value of information is dependent not only on its 
source, content and latency, but just as importantly on 
the context of the situation in which it is being 
exercised. Building upon previous research aimed at 
codifying the value of information, this paper presents 
a multi-facetted experiment meant to discern a 
Soldier’s value of information within varying military 
contexts. Initial results reveal that context plays a 
significant role in how information is valued and more 
importantly provides a foundation for strengthening 
human-agent information understanding and 
collaboration. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Modern military operations are framed by a myriad 
of information sources that provide an unprecedented 
volume, velocity, and variety of information not found 
in most other domains. While on the surface it would 
seem that the more information the better, the fact is 
having too much information increases cognitive work 
load and potentially results in overlooking information 
that is relevant to the current situation [1, 2]. Required 
is a process for foraging and transforming large 
amounts of heterogeneous data from multiple sources 
into useful situational understanding, that in turn would 
accelerate and improve the decision making process 
[3]. A key feature of such a process would be a method 
for judging the importance of pieces of information. 
The Value of Information (VoI) metric is such a 
feature [4, 5].  
The task of determining which information is 
valuable is a difficult process. To assist in combating 
this challenge, the U.S. Army Research Laboratory 
(ARL) has established Human-Agent Teaming (HAT) 
as one of its essential research areas (ERA).  The HAT 
ERA is focused on leveraging the strengths of both the 
human and intelligent agents to improve overall 
operational performance [6]. Thus, teams of humans 
and intelligent agents are performing military-relevant 
tasks more efficiently and effectively than either group 
does alone.  One of the goals of this initiative, and the 
subject of this research, is context-based information 
sharing to efficiently provide the information each 
Soldier/Agent needs; sharing concepts, intentions, and 
situations while not overburdening the systems. 
With that goal in mind, this paper presents the 
initial steps to understanding context-based 
information sharing with an experiment designed to 
discern the role context plays in the value of 
information. The experiment builds upon previous 
research that successfully captured and codified how 
analysts perceive the value of information (VoI) given 
its source, content, and latency [7, 8, 9]. The remainder 
of the paper is organized into the following 4 sections. 
Section 2 presents background on the military 
challenge, VoI determination, and the state of the 
current prototype. In Section 3, the VoI Context Study 
is presented followed by a look at some early results 
and analysis in Section 4. Concluding remarks and 
future directions are given in Section 5. 
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 2. Background 
  
2.1. Understanding the Domain Challenge 
  
Commander’s intent is a salient characteristic in the 
military decision making process and dependent on 
developing accurate situational awareness and 
understanding [10]. Situational Awareness (SA) is 
formally defined as a person’s “perception of the 
elements in the environment within a volume of time 
and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the 
projection of their status in the near future” [11].  
While having good SA generally indicates knowledge 
of “what” is occurring, having good situational 
understanding (SU) leads us to recognize the “why” 
and potential consequences in the decision space.  
Relevant information is the key to developing the SU 
and ultimately making the correct decision. 
Today’s military operations utilize information 
from a myriad of sources that provide overwhelming 
amounts of data. Shown in Table 1 are the range of 
reports received at each military echelon and the 
timescale to plan and execute a mission. While the 
times are notional, the general policy for military 
planning is that one-third of the available time be used 
for planning at any echelon, leaving two-thirds of the 
time for planning at lower echelons. The execution 
times represent the notational time durations needed to 
carry out a typical mission at that echelon [12]. 
Needless to say, accurate and timely VoI estimations 
are essential to the information analysis process and 
integral to battlefield success. Long-term, human-agent 
teaming is envisioned as critical to supporting this 
process with intelligent information foraging and 
transformation agents capable of acting in concert with 
the context of the current operation and overall mission 
goal. 
Table 1. Typical Range of Information and 
Executing Times [12] 
Echelon Reports per hour 
Plannin
g 
Time 
Execution 
Time 
Division ~Millions Week Week/ Days 
Brigade 170K Days Days 
Battalion 56K Days /hours Day 
Company 18K Hours Hours 
Platoon 6K Hour Hour/Min 
 
2.2. Value of Information Determination 
 
Assigning a VoI assessment to an information 
element is a multiple step process requiring 
intelligence collectors and analysts to judge the 
information’s value within a host of differing 
operational situations. For the military, this process is 
abstractly defined within two documents: the annex to 
NATO STANAG (Standard Agreement) 2022 along 
with Appendix B of US Army FM-2-22.3 [13, 14].  
This guidance provides two tables for judging the 
“reliability” and “content” of a piece of data, with each 
characteristic broken into six categories.  Reliability 
relates to the information source, and is ranked from A 
to F (reliable, usually reliable, fairly reliable, not 
usually reliable, unreliable, and cannot judge).  
Information content is ranked from 1 to 6 (confirmed, 
probably true, possibly true, doubtfully true, 
improbable, and cannot judge).  While doctrinal 
guidance does exist for grading an information 
element, it does not provide any process for combining 
these determinations into a VoI metric.  Additionally, 
combining only these two assessments of a piece of 
information falls far short of representing all of the 
critical aspects that determine ‘relevant’ information. 
Two other important data characteristics include 
latency and mission context.  Latency refers to how 
long ago the piece of information was collected.  In 
general, the latest time of value for a piece of 
information is determined by the echelon of operation.  
At the Company and Platoon levels for example, 
information perishability is within hours.  As a 
surrogate for mission context, the original VoI research 
substituted operations tempo in its place. Here, 
operations tempo relates to the decision cycle for the 
mission; that is, the time that can or will be used to 
plan, prepare, and execute the mission.  Operations 
tempo is generally divided into three levels: strategic, 
operational and tactical. On the operations tempo 
spectrum, strategic operations generally have decision 
cycles measured in months or longer. Tactical 
operations, on the other hand, measure their decision 
cycle in minutes to hours, with operational level lying 
somewhere between.  
 
2.3. Current VoI Prototype 
  
Working with analysts from the U.S. Army 
Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE), a fuzzy-
based approach was adopted for developing a 
prototype decision support system that assists with VoI 
determination. Specifically, a Fuzzy Associative 
Memory (FAM) model was utilized to construct the 
original VoI System.  A FAM is a k-dimensional table 
where each dimension corresponds to one of the input 
domains of the rules.  Fuzzy if-then rules are 
represented within the FAM [15, 16 17].  While 
numerous characteristics could be applicable to 
determining the VoI, the features of source reliability 
Page 503
 (SR), information content (IC), timeliness, and 
operations tempo were used as the starting point to 
construct the original Single-Source VoI System. The 
architecture of the original Single-Source VoI System 
is shown in Figure 2.   
   
 
Figure 1: Single-Source VoI FAM Overview 
The output from the system is determined by the 
standard fuzzy centroid defuzzification strategy.  More 
detailed descriptions of the FAMs and the series of 
surveys and interviews with subject matter experts 
(SMEs) that were used to codify the cognitive 
requirements, collect the functional requirements, and 
elicit the fuzzy rules of the single-source prototype 
system can be found in [7, 18].  The current multi-
source information amalgamation prototype is capable 
of determining the VoI for a combination of 
information elements that either complement or 
contradict an original element of information [19].  
Limiting the current fuzzy model is the use of the 
operations tempo (strategic, operational, and tactical) 
as a surrogate for mission context. To be effective, an 
understanding of how mission context influences the 
VoI in a military environment must be undertaken.   
 
3. VoI Context Study  
 
Studying and ultimately modeling the role context 
plays in the valuation of information in a military 
environment is a daunting task. In addition to 
developing scenarios with the fidelity required to 
adequately define a military context, obtaining access 
to the number of Soldiers required to run a study is a 
near impossible task.  
With the assistance of the U.S. Army Research 
Institute’s Umbrella Weeks (UWs) program the 
challenge of Soldier access was solved.  UWs are 
Department of Army sponsored events that mandate 
organizations across the Army grant an annual one-
week access period to Army research agencies for the 
purpose of studies involving Soldiers and facilities.   
For the VoI Context Study (VCS) three UWs were 
identified during fiscal year 2018: Fort Lewis during 
May 2018, Fort Bragg and Fort Riley during July 2018. 
During the first VCS at Fort Lewis, ARL was afforded 
access to 77 Soldiers from the 7th Infantry Division 
and the 393rd Expeditionary Support Command. The 
Soldiers participating in this first study varied in age 
from 18 to 45 years old, in experience from 8 months 
to over 10 years and covered over 15 different 
occupational specialties.   The 3-day study was divided 
into (15) 30-minute sessions, 5 sessions per day.  Each 
session allowed 5-7 Soldiers to participate at a time.   
Each session began by defining the macro context 
of the given military scenario.  This critical piece of the 
study was accomplished by showing and explaining the 
information on Figure 3.  At a high-level, the Soldiers 
were told they were to assume they were assigned to a 
unit deployed to an area of operations (AO) in southern 
Iraq on a stability operation and one of their primary 
tasks was to analyze information and make judgments 
as to its value to the operation.  The operation was 
further refined by defining five Priority Information 
Requirements (PIRs). PIRs are information that the 
commander has deemed vital to his/her on-going 
decision making process. Placing the Soldiers within a 
defined geographical AO and giving them definite 
mission objectives frames their area of interest (AI).  
Combined with their particular occupational training 
and experience, the AI, at a high-level of abstraction, 
defines a Soldier’s military context. 
With the macro context defined, the Soldiers were 
then guided through a series of vignettes that defined 
the micro context of the military situation. The 
vignettes served as the primary independent variable 
permitting manipulation of the relevancy of the 
information introduced to the Soldiers that was to be 
scored.  Shown in Figure 4, the vignettes are divided 
into three categories: High, Medium and Low.  
Relevant-High vignettes contain information that is 
regarded as highly mission relevant and containing PIR 
information.  Relevant-Medium vignettes contain 
information that might be considered mission relevant 
and may or may not contain PIR information. The 
Relevant-Low vignette contains information that is not 
considered mission relevant. Importantly, the vignettes 
included in the study were vetted by an Army SME 
before the study began.  
While micro context served as the primary 
independent variable of the study, the second 
independent variable added to each vignette was the 
source reliability (SR) rating of the information given. 
The SR is an evaluation as to the trustworthiness of the 
information. This second variable was used to 
determine the degree to which SR had on the valuing a 
given context. For example, even though a given 
vignette could be rated highly mission relevant, the fact 
is was associated with an unreliable source could 
potentially diminish its perceived value. Depicted in 
Table 2 is the official military SR rating table. For the 
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 study, the following four SR categories were 
examined: (1) fairly reliable, (2) unknown, (3) usually 
reliable or (4) unreliable.  This variable was held 
constant during each participant’s trial.  
The SR rating along with a collection of vignettes 
defined an experimental Vignette Group (VG): 
• Vignette Group #1 (VG-1): contained vignettes 
A, B, C and D with an information source deemed 
fairly reliable. 
• Vignette Group #2 (VG-2): contained vignettes 
A, B, C and E with an information source deemed 
unknown. 
• Vignette Group #3 (VG-3): contained vignettes 
A, B, C and D with an information source deemed 
usually reliable. 
• Vignette Group #4 (VG-4): contained vignettes 
A, B, C and E with an information source deemed 
unreliable. 
Note: Each Vignette Group contained a Relevant High 
A-vignette, Relevant Medium B-vignette, Relevant 
Low C-vignette, along with a fourth vignette of either 
Relevant High D-vignette or Relevant Medium E-
vignette. 
  Table 2: Source Reliability Table 
A Reliable 
No doubt of authenticity, 
trustworthiness, or competency; has a 
history of complete reliability 
B Usually Reliable 
Minor doubt about authenticity, 
trustworthiness, or competency; has a 
history of valid information most of 
the time 
C Fairly Reliable 
Doubt of authenticity, 
trustworthiness, or competency but 
has provided valid information in the 
past 
D 
Not 
Usually 
Reliable 
Significant doubt about authenticity, 
trustworthiness, or competency but 
has provided valid information in the 
past 
E Unreliable 
Lacking in authenticity, 
trustworthiness, and competency; 
history of invalid information 
F Unknown No basis exists for evaluating the reliability of the source 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Military Operation - Macro Context Overview 
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 Relevant High Relevant Medium Relevant Low 
IED Vignette (A) 
 
Background: ‘MSR CHEVY’ has not 
had an IED event in over 6 months and 
was pronounced clear by a route 
reconnaissance mission this AM 
 
Report: A Tactical Interrogation Report 
from a fairly reliable source dated last 
night mentions an expected IED 
emplacement on MSR CHEVY. 
CSS Protest Vignette (B) 
 
Background: Deep divides between 
local Shia and Sunni Muslims have 
existed for centuries. Areas where these 
factions are in close proximity can cause 
protests and violence.  
 
Report: Reports from a fairly reliable 
source indicate that Sunni protests 
against Shia merchants in the downtown 
market area are planned and threaten to 
disrupt normal patterns of life 
Outside AO Vignette (C) 
 
Background: The boarder situation 
along Syria and Turkey has always 
been an area of contention between 
Turkey and the Syrian Kurds. Tension 
between militia groups could lead to all 
out conflict. 
 
Report: COMINT from a fairly 
reliable radio station reports increased 
cross border engagements between 
Syrian Kurds and the Turkish military. 
ADA Vignette (D) 
 
Background: HQ is planning an air 
insertion into a remote village to search 
for weapons caches. Air traffic at the 
FOB is heavy with no significant threat 
incident in the last 3 months. 
 
Report: A fairly reliable HUMINT 
source indicates that threat forces are 
planning attacks on US air assets 
Sentiment Vignette (E) 
 
Background: The populace within the 
AO has been generally neutral toward 
US presence. Friendly attacks on threats 
have recently resulted in collateral 
damage. 
 
Report: A fairly reliable informant 
reports that a local Imam is voicing anti-
US sentiment and antagonistic views. 
 
Figure 3. Military Vignettes - Micro Context 
 
 
With the macro and micro context defined, Soldiers 
were first guided through a practice vignette to 
acquaint them with the scoring process and allowed to 
ask any questions.  After that they were guided through 
a randomized series of vignettes associated with one of 
the predefined Vignette Groups. 
Shown in Figure 5 is the Context Survey Form used 
in the VoI Context Study. The survey consists of 3 
measures: Mission Relevancy, PIR existence, and the 
Information Value Scale.  The first two measures 
(Mission Relevancy and PIR Existence) served as 
robustness checks and to validate the micro context 
manipulations; ostensibly verifying the context 
agreement.  The Mission Relevance Scores will later 
be used as a surrogate dependent variable and 
correlated against the value scores. The third measure, 
the value scale, measured the Soldier’s perceived value 
of the information given the context of the macro and 
micro environment. To keep it in a military vernacular, 
the anchors on the value scale were chosen to represent 
typical military response to new information. 
During each vignette, after the background 
statement was read, Soldiers were asked to mark, in no 
particular order, how mission relevant the new piece of 
information was, whether it addressed any of the PIRs, 
and how valuable they perceived the information to be.  
Each Soldier scored the four vignettes associated with 
his/her VG. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Context Survey Form 
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 4. Results and Analysis 
 
Analysis of the results reveals that context and 
source reliability play a significant role in how 
information is valued depending on its perceived 
relevance to the current operation. More importantly, 
the results provide an early understanding as to why 
information is valued differently. To facilitate the 
analysis presentation, each Vignette Group (the 
collection of vignettes associated with its information 
source rating) will be examined separately. For 
completeness, a covariance analysis for each VG and 
each vignette type is included. 
 
4.1. Vignette Group #1 Results and Analysis - 
Fairly Reliable Source  
 
Included in VG-1 are vignettes A, B, C and D.  The 
SR associated with VG-1 is fairly reliable. This rating 
was held constant for all the vignettes in this vignette 
group.  
As depicted in Table 3 and Figure 6, analysis of 
VG-1 shows dramatic and distinct differences across 
the primary vignettes (A, B & C).  The Value of 
Vignette A (Relevant-High) that dealt with the possible 
appearance of an improvised explosive device scored 
an average of 8.33 – meaning it fell just short of Report 
at the Daily Brief on our Likert Scale rating, where the 
value of Vignette C (Relevant-Low) that had to do with 
a skirmish along the Syrian border (not in area of 
operation) scored 4.8 – meaning it was in the Note 
without action range.  In this instance, given 
information with the same source reliability, the 4 
point difference on the Likert Scale is significant and 
shows context played a major role in valuing the new 
information. 
 The PIR score of 1 for Vignette A indicates every 
participant identified this information as meeting a 
commander’s priority information requirement. 
Notably, the measures between Vignettes A and D 
(both Relevant High) scored almost identical across the 
board.  The PIR for Vignette B and C were 
significantly lower along with the Mission Relevancy 
scores. 
To test that the VoI scores were from different 
population distributions, a Kolmogorov-Smirnoff 2-
Sample test was run across all the VoI scores.  Figure 7 
shows that with a D score of .62 and a P value of 
.000004, the scores associated with Vignette A and C 
are definitely not from the same distribution.  And as 
expected in Figure 8, we see that with a D score of .23 
and P value of .53, Vignette A and D (both Relevant 
High) share the same distribution characteristics. 
Table 3. VG-1 Average Scores 
Vignette 
Mission 
Relevancy 
VoI                 
Score 
PIR 
Score 
A (R-High) 4.28 8.33 1 
B (R-Med) 3.11 6.14 .38 
C (R-Low) 2.47 4.8 .23 
D (R-High) 4.42 8 .95 
 
          
Figure 5. Box Plot VoI Results of VG-1 
 
 
Figure 6. KS comparison of VG-1 (A vs C) 
 
Figure 7. KS comparison of VG-1 (A vs D) 
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 4.2. Vignette Group #2 Results and Analysis - 
Unknown Source  
 
Associated with the VG-2 are vignettes A, B, C and 
E.  The SR assigned to VG-2 is that of unknown. 
Meaning, ‘no basis’ exists for evaluating the reliability 
of the source. This rating was held constant for all the 
vignettes in this vignette group.  
Interestingly, analysis of VG-2 does not show a 
dramatic or distinct difference across the vignettes.  In 
point of fact, analysis of Table 3 and Figure 9 reveals 
Vignettes B, C and E share similar VoI scores.  Where 
we do see a difference is between Vignettes A 
(Relevant High) and the rest of the vignettes. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnoff 2-Sample test between Vignette 
A and the other VG-2 vignettes confirms this belief 
with an average P score of .007 and a D score of .56. 
For completeness, Figure 10 shows the KS plot for 
Vignette A versus C; with B and E being similar. 
Table 3. VG-2 Average Scores 
Vignette 
Mission 
Relevancy 
VoI                 
Score 
PIR 
Score 
A (R-High) 4.43 8.00 1 
B (R-Med) 3.38 5.3 .62 
C (R-Low) 2.56 4.9 .37 
E (R-Med) 3.00 5 .56 
 
 
Figure 8. Box Plot VoI Results of VG-2 
The question then is: with everything being equal 
except for the information source – why does VG-2 
differ radically from VG-1? Army SMEs explained the 
possible difference this way:  If you received a phone 
call from an unknown source telling you there was a 
bomb in the building, you have to react as if it is true; 
the consequence is potentially very high.  On the other 
hand, if an unknown source tells you a local cleric is 
happy with US presence in the area – you might more 
easily dismiss it. In this case, the consequence of not 
reacting immediately is far less. 
 
Figure 9. KS comparison of VG-2 (A vs C) 
 
4.3. Vignette Group #3 Results and Analysis - 
Usually Reliable Source  
 
Included in VG-3 are vignettes A, B, C and D.  
Similar to VG-1, the only difference between the two 
vignette groupings is the SR rating. Rather than a fairly 
reliable SR rating, VG-3 utilizes a higher rated usually 
reliable source rating. This SR rating was held constant 
for all the vignettes in this vignette group.  
Not unexpectedly, the results of VG-3 follow a 
similar pattern as VG-1.  As depicted in Table 4 and 
Figure 11, analysis of VG-3 shows dramatic and 
distinct differences across the primary vignettes (A, B 
& C). Interestingly, the average VoI score associated 
with Vignette A is actually a little higher (9.27 vs 8.33) 
in VG-3 than that found in VG-1. SME analysis 
attributed this higher scoring to the source reliability 
being higher; the higher the reliability the higher the 
trust.  In that same vein, all the VoI Scores in VG-3 
were higher than the other vignette groups; ostensibly 
because of the higher information source rating.   
To test that the distributions were from different 
populations, a Kolmogorov-Smirnoff 2-Sample test 
was run across all the VoI scores.  Figures 12 and 13 
respectively, reveal vignette A and C are not from the 
same distribution with a D score of .67 and an 
associated P-value of .0009; and vignettes A and D 
share the same distribution characteristics with a D 
score of .27 and an associate P value of .52.   
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 Table 4. VG-3 Average Scores 
Vignette 
Mission 
Relevancy 
VoI                 
Score 
PIR 
Score 
A (R-High) 4.7 9.27 .95 
B (R-Med) 3.7 7.33 .38 
C (R-Low) 2.44 5.33 .23 
D (R-High) 4.37 8.61 .83 
 
 
Figure 10. Box Plot VoI Results of VG-3 
 
Figure 11. KS comparison of VG-3 (A vs C) 
 
Figure 12. KS comparison of VG-3 (A vs D) 
 
4.4. Vignette Group #4 Results and Analysis - 
Unreliable Source  
 
Associated with VG-4 are vignettes A, B, C and E.  
VG-4 has a SR rating that is unreliable; the lowest 
possible information source rating. This source rating 
was held constant for all the vignettes in this vignette 
group.  
Similar to VG-2, VG-4 reveals an interesting trend.  
Analysis of Table 5 and Figure 14 reveal there is 
virtually little difference in the mission relevance and 
VoI scores. The only difference between the vignettes 
is the PIR rating with vignette A.   
Kolmogorov-Smirnoff 2-Sample tests run across 
the entire set of VoI scores revealed none of the 
distributions were from different populations. In the 
best case, shown in Figure 15, the difference between 
the Relevant-High Vignette-A and Relevant-Low 
Vignette-C, was scored a D statistic of .26 a P value of 
.47.  
Army SME analysts attribute the consistently low 
scores associated with this vignette group to the 
unreliable information source. One SME used the 
crying wolf analogy to describe the results …. once 
someone has proven to fabricate the truth it is nearly 
impossible to move beyond that point. 
Table 5. VG-4 Average Scores 
Vignette 
Mission 
Relevancy 
VoI                 
Score 
PIR 
Score 
A (R-High) 4.15 5.8 1 
B (R-Med) 3 4.78 .42 
C (R-Low) 2.8 4.78 .42 
E (R-Med) 3.15 4.42 .42 
 
 
Figure 13. Box Plot VoI Results of VG-4 
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Figure 14. KS comparison of VG-4 (A vs C) 
 
4.5. Correlation Analysis of VGs and Vignette 
  
With a goal of being able to model and test the 
results of the study, one of the other outcomes of 
interest was whether monotonicity existed between the 
dependent (micro context) variable and the 
independent (perceived information value) variable. 
The general hypothesis was that the greater the 
relevance to the “mission”, the higher the perceived 
value of the information should be; and further, the 
higher the SR rating of the information, the greater the 
magnitude associated with that valuation. To test for 
correlation, a Spearman's rank-order correlation 
statistic was calculated between the surrogate 
dependent variable Mission Relevance Score and the 
Information valuation score. Shown in Tables 6 and 7 
are the correlation coefficients associated with 
aggregated scores for each vignette group and the 
individual vignettes, respectively. In each case a 
positive correlation exists between mission relevance 
and the information valuation.  
 
Table 6: Vignette Group Correlation Scores 
Vignette Group 
Spearman Rank 
Correlation Coef. 
VG-1 .66 
VG-2 .76 
VG-3 .78 
VG-4 .59 
Table 7: Vignette Type Correlation Scores 
Vignette Type 
Spearman Rank 
Correlation Coef. 
A (R-High) .59 
B (R-Med) .57 
C (R-Low) .79 
D (R-High) .53 
E (R-Med) .61 
Evidence of the monotonic relationship between 
Mission Relevance vs Information Valuation can be 
seen in Figure 16 (a), (b) and (c); illustrated are the 
scatter plots associated with Vignettes A, B, and C.  
For each scenario a positive correlation can be seen. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion / Future Direction  
 
Development of effective human-agent teaming 
requires a shared understanding between the human 
and the intelligent agents acting on their behalf, 
especially at the information level.  With a goal of 
providing effective, context-based information sharing, 
this paper presents the initial steps necessary to discern 
the role context plays in the value of information and 
lays the foundation for modeling information valuation 
in a military environment. 
Analysis of the results revealed that context plays a 
statistically significant role in how information is 
valued depending on its perceived relevance to the 
current operation. For this study, the mechanics of how 
proved to be fairly intuitive – the greater the mission 
relevance, the greater the perceived information value. 
However, digging a little deeper, the results also 
unveiled some less obvious trends and give an early 
Figure 16(a) Vignette A - Scatterplot 
Figure 16(b) Vignette B - Scatterplot 
Figure 16(c) Vignette C - Scatterplot 
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 understanding as to “why”. For example, in the cases 
where the source of the information was unknown 
(VG2), only in the relevant-high vignette (where the 
projection of the consequence was life threatening) did 
the value of the information correlate.  Likewise, when 
the source of the information was rated usually 
unreliable, even though the mission relevance was 
rated high, the information valuation did not follow the 
general trend and actually treated it the same for all 
four vignettes. Army SME analysts attribute the 
consistently low scores associated with this vignette 
group to a crying wolf analogy …. once someone has 
proven to fabricate the truth it is nearly impossible to 
move beyond that point. 
Obviously with a topic as subjective as information 
valuation much research remains to be done – from the 
psychological underpinnings of confirmation bias to 
effective group intelligence. That said, armed with the 
insights from this study, two logical next steps are 
planned. First, a human-in-the-loop validation 
experiment is scheduled for the middle of fiscal year 
2019 where software agents codified with improved 
context-enable VoI FAMs will act to prioritize an 
information foraging assignment.  Second, working 
with Army SMEs, the mission context concept will be 
further expanded to include the information elements 
of the operations order (OPORD).  An OPORD is the 
official military directive given in order to coordinate 
execution of a specific operation. 
With the advent of improved machine learning and 
artificial intelligence, the realization of effective teams 
of humans and intelligent agents performing military-
relevant tasks is fast becoming a reality.  In the future, 
not only will the right information be delivered at the 
right time, in the right form – but sharing the concepts, 
intentions, understanding and beliefs will become 
commonplace. 
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